Ce n'est pas une crise de liquidité mais une crise de solvabilité.
C'est-à-dire pas une révolte, mais une révolution.

(des petits graphiques pour illustrer:
http://www.contraryinvestor.com/mo.htm)


"Worse than LTCM," by Nouriel Roubini


Economists distinguish between liquidity crises and insolvency/debt
crises. An agent (household, firm, financial corporation, country) can
experience distress either because it is illiquid or because it is
insolvent; of course insolvent agents are – in most cases - also
illiquid, i.e. they cannot roll over their debts. Illiquidity occurs
when the agent is solvent – i.e. it could pay its debts over time as
long as such debts can be refinanced or rolled over - but he/she
experiences a sudden liquidity crisis, i.e. its creditors are
unwilling to roll over or refinance its claims. An insolvent debtor
does not only face a liquidity problem (large amounts of debts coming
to maturity, little stock of liquid reserves and no ability to
refinance). It is also insolvent as it could not pay its claim over
time even if there was no liquidity problem; thus, debt crises are
more severe than illiquidity crises as they imply that the debtor is
insolvent, i.e. bankrupt, and its debt claims will be defaulted and
reduced.....

Today we do not have only a liquidity crisis like in 1998; we also
have a insolvency/debt crisis among a variety of borrowers that
overborrowed excessively during the boom phase of the latest Minsky
credit bubble.

First, you have hundreds of thousands of US households who are
insolvent on their mortgages. And this is not just a subprime problem:
the same reckless lending practices used in subprime – no downpayment,
no verification of income and assets, interest rate only loans,
negative amortization, teaser rates – were used for near prime, Alt-A
loans, hybrid prime ARMs, home equity loans, piggyback loans. More
than 50% of all mortgage originations in 2005 and 2006 had this toxic
waste characteristics. That is why you will have hundreds of thousands
– perhaps over a million - of subprime, near prime and prime borrowers
who will end up in delinquency, default and foreclosure. Lots of
insolvent borrowers.

You also have lots of insolvent mortgage lenders – not just the 60
plus subprime ones who have already gone out of business – but also
plenty of near prime and prime ones. AHM – that went bankrupt last
week – was not exposed mostly to subprime; it was exposed to near
prime and prime. Countrywide has reported sharp losses not only on
subprime lending but also on prime ones. So on top of insolvent
households/mortgage borrowers you have plenty of insolvent mortgage
lenders, subprime and - soon enough - near prime and prime.

You will also have – soon enough – plenty of insolvent home builders.
Many small ones have gone out of business; now it is likely that some
of the larger ones will follow in the next few months. Beazer Homes –
a major home builder - last week had to refute rumors of its impending
insolvency; but so did AHM a few weeks before its insolvency. With
orders for home builders falling 30-40% and cancellation rates above
30% more than a few home builders will become insolvent over the next
year or so.

We also have insolvent hedge funds and other funds exposed to subprime
and other mortgages. A few – at Bear Stearns, in Australia, in
Germany, in France – have already gone bankrupt or are near bankrupt.
You can be sure that with at least of $100 billion of subprime alone
losses – and most losses are still hidden given the reckless practice
of mark-to-model rather than mark-to-market - many more will go belly
up. In the meanwhile the CDO, CLO and LBO market have completed closed
down - a “constipated owl” where “absolutely nothing moves” the way
Bill Gross of Pimco put it. This is for now a liquidity crisis in
these credit markets; but credit events will occur given that the
underlying problem was not of of liquidity but rather one of
insolvency: if you take a bunch of to-be-defaulted subprime and near
prime mortgages and you repackage them into RMBS and then these RMBS
are repackaged into various tranches of CDOs, the rating agencies may
be using magic voodoo to turn those junk BBB- mortgages into AAA
tranches of CDOs; but this is only voodoo as the underlying assets are
going to be defaulted on.....

C'est peut etre pas si con que ca de commencer a s'interesser aux obligs
et autres produits de taux

Merci pour ce liens tres interessant.








--
Vsin

Je ne connaîtrai pas la peur, car la peur tue l'esprit. La peur est la
petite mort qui conduit à l'oblitération totale. J'affronterai ma peur.
Je lui permettrai de passer sur moi, au travers de moi. Et lorsqu'elle
sera passée, je tournerai mon oeil intérieur sur mon chemin. Et là où
elle sera passée, il n'y aura plus rien. Rien que moi.

Vsin wrote:
> C'est peut etre pas si con que ca de commencer a s'interesser aux obligs
> et autres produits de taux
>


Comment va-t-on se sortir de cette crise ?
Pour moi, deux points essentiels :
1. La lutte contre l'inflation va etre un peu moins prioritaire.
L'inflation est un moyen de sauver les emprunteurs en diminuant
la vraie valeur de leurs remboursements. Les taux reels ont donc
de bonnes chances de baisser, mais ils sont deja assez faibles
et il ne faut pas hypothequer tout reepongeage des flots de ces
derniers jours, donc produits de taux, oui, mais sans exces.
2. Les etablissements financiers, et les europeens sans doute
encore plus que les US, vont devoir faire la revolution dans
leur business model. A terme, ce sera plutot sain, mais en
attendant, ils vont souffrir. Par contre, les actions des
briques et du mortier, toute speculation degonflee - ce qui
ne devrait plus tarder maintenant - n'ont pas trop de raisons
de souffrir. De plus, les liquidites chinoises, emirales et
autres ne devraient pas avoir tant diminue que ca. Et
si j'etais un riche Emir Chinois, l'occasion de mettre la
main sur quelques vaches a lait industrielles me tenterait
au dela du raisonnable aux prix de cette semaine ou des prochaines.

oui OK, mais la 2eme entraine la 1ere....
nous par exemple, on ne veut plus preter de cash à Bear Sterns
ou à Lehman....si ya 2 ou 3 banques qui font pareil, ben tu vas voir
le cash court terme OTC s'envoler....

"Ralph Wanker" <rw@ww.com> a écrit dans le message de news:
1qe0c3hv8p4ftr34f78a7u0ahfq3a2ls0d@4ax.com...
> Ce n'est pas une crise de liquidité mais une crise de solvabilité.
> C'est-à-dire pas une révolte, mais une révolution.
>
> (des petits graphiques pour illustrer:
> http://www.contraryinvestor.com/mo.htm)
>
>
> "Worse than LTCM," by Nouriel Roubini
>
>
> Economists distinguish between liquidity crises and insolvency/debt
> crises. An agent (household, firm, financial corporation, country) can
> experience distress either because it is illiquid or because it is
> insolvent; of course insolvent agents are - in most cases - also
> illiquid, i.e. they cannot roll over their debts. Illiquidity occurs
> when the agent is solvent - i.e. it could pay its debts over time as
> long as such debts can be refinanced or rolled over - but he/she
> experiences a sudden liquidity crisis, i.e. its creditors are
> unwilling to roll over or refinance its claims. An insolvent debtor
> does not only face a liquidity problem (large amounts of debts coming
> to maturity, little stock of liquid reserves and no ability to
> refinance). It is also insolvent as it could not pay its claim over
> time even if there was no liquidity problem; thus, debt crises are
> more severe than illiquidity crises as they imply that the debtor is
> insolvent, i.e. bankrupt, and its debt claims will be defaulted and
> reduced.....
>
> Today we do not have only a liquidity crisis like in 1998; we also
> have a insolvency/debt crisis among a variety of borrowers that
> overborrowed excessively during the boom phase of the latest Minsky
> credit bubble.
>
> First, you have hundreds of thousands of US households who are
> insolvent on their mortgages. And this is not just a subprime problem:
> the same reckless lending practices used in subprime - no downpayment,
> no verification of income and assets, interest rate only loans,
> negative amortization, teaser rates - were used for near prime, Alt-A
> loans, hybrid prime ARMs, home equity loans, piggyback loans. More
> than 50% of all mortgage originations in 2005 and 2006 had this toxic
> waste characteristics. That is why you will have hundreds of thousands
> - perhaps over a million - of subprime, near prime and prime borrowers
> who will end up in delinquency, default and foreclosure. Lots of
> insolvent borrowers.
>
> You also have lots of insolvent mortgage lenders - not just the 60
> plus subprime ones who have already gone out of business - but also
> plenty of near prime and prime ones. AHM - that went bankrupt last
> week - was not exposed mostly to subprime; it was exposed to near
> prime and prime. Countrywide has reported sharp losses not only on
> subprime lending but also on prime ones. So on top of insolvent
> households/mortgage borrowers you have plenty of insolvent mortgage
> lenders, subprime and - soon enough - near prime and prime.
>
> You will also have - soon enough - plenty of insolvent home builders.
> Many small ones have gone out of business; now it is likely that some
> of the larger ones will follow in the next few months. Beazer Homes -
> a major home builder - last week had to refute rumors of its impending
> insolvency; but so did AHM a few weeks before its insolvency. With
> orders for home builders falling 30-40% and cancellation rates above
> 30% more than a few home builders will become insolvent over the next
> year or so.
>
> We also have insolvent hedge funds and other funds exposed to subprime
> and other mortgages. A few - at Bear Stearns, in Australia, in
> Germany, in France - have already gone bankrupt or are near bankrupt.
> You can be sure that with at least of $100 billion of subprime alone
> losses - and most losses are still hidden given the reckless practice
> of mark-to-model rather than mark-to-market - many more will go belly
> up. In the meanwhile the CDO, CLO and LBO market have completed closed
> down - a "constipated owl" where "absolutely nothing moves" the way
> Bill Gross of Pimco put it. This is for now a liquidity crisis in
> these credit markets; but credit events will occur given that the
> underlying problem was not of of liquidity but rather one of
> insolvency: if you take a bunch of to-be-defaulted subprime and near
> prime mortgages and you repackage them into RMBS and then these RMBS
> are repackaged into various tranches of CDOs, the rating agencies may
> be using magic voodoo to turn those junk BBB- mortgages into AAA
> tranches of CDOs; but this is only voodoo as the underlying assets are
> going to be defaulted on.....

les oblig, le money market et les produits de taux c'est la vraie économie,
la macro économie, les actions c'est pour les tarlouzes lol

"Vsin" <vsin_zob_au_spam@free.fr> a écrit dans le message de news:
46c03d74$0$408$426a74cc@news.free.fr...
> C'est peut etre pas si con que ca de commencer a s'interesser aux obligs
> et autres produits de taux
>
> Merci pour ce liens tres interessant.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Vsin
>
> Je ne connaîtrai pas la peur, car la peur tue l'esprit. La peur est la
> petite mort qui conduit à l'oblitération totale. J'affronterai ma peur. Je
> lui permettrai de passer sur moi, au travers de moi. Et lorsqu'elle sera
> passée, je tournerai mon oeil intérieur sur mon chemin. Et là où elle sera
> passée, il n'y aura plus rien. Rien que moi.

Je suis tout à fait d'accord Mol sur l'inflation, les banques centrales vont
avoir la débilité de sacrifier la lutte enfin débutée contre l'inflation et
les bulles financières (qu'elles ont gaiment alimenté depuis 10 ans). Le
résultat : une inflation galopante dans 2-3 ans. C'est forcé : le monde
croît à 5% par an, les taux réels (après inflation) sont à 2% dans le monde.
Pas tenable dans n'importe quel modèle macroéconomique. Deux possibilités:
- les banques centrales restent crédibles : flambée des taux réels qui
passent de 2 à 4-5%, les porteurs d'obligations fixes ET inflation se font
lessiver
- les banques centrales perdent leur crédibilité : flambée de l'inflation,
les porteux d'obligations fixes se font lessiver, ceux d'obligations
inflation limitent la casse

Je penche pour le premier scénario dans mon grand optimisme naturel.

Concernant la liquidité, je pense que ça ne veut pas dire grand chose de
regarder le montant de cash disponible, il vaut mieux regarder la volonté
d'investissement. La chine par exemple a investi 97% de ses réserves en
obligations gouvernementales. Ce n'est donc pas en soi un apporteur de
liquidité. Les vrais apporteurs de liquidité sont les hedge funds (et il y a
10 ans les banques), qui vont se faire tarter royalement.

Shivar

Shivar